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INTRODUCTION 
Basically, the title selected has to deal with the 
characteristics of, and relations between, many 
and complex components. Due to the short time 
available some of these contributing factors can 
only be touched and I am very aware of the risk 
of over-simplification. So I can only try to give a 
representative cross section. 
Although this paper primarily offers general- 
ized statements, these are based on operational 
and experimental flight and simulator experience, 
on literature- and some theoretical studies, and 
on an evaluation of a new display concept. 
Information on more specific results is, or will be, 
presented in other papers (refs. 1 through 4). 
Manual control e.g., of an aircraft landing 
would be (under the impression of the previous 
paper of Dr. Naish I should modify to: “seems 
to be) no problem, if best visual contact with the 
outside environment would be continuously 
available. In  general, this is true even for poor 
aircraft dynamics. 
Actual operating conditions, however, are 
more or less below optimum, down to absolute 
zero visibility. We all know that under these 
conditions aircraft control becomes critical as 
soon as solid objects in the environment of the 
aircraft severely restrict the use of one or more 
of the six degrees of freedom, especially when the 
speed is extremely low or high. Several remarks 
in literature try to base the “all” weather landing 
problems on limited human abilities in manual 
control. The pilot as a controller should be sub- 
stituted by automatics, as shown by the quotes 
from reference 5 
. . . even with the best available displays the pilot has 
not been able to control (the blind landing) with the 
precisionrequired . . . 
and reference 6 
There is no doubt that in complex flying tasks like blind 
landing . . . automatics become essential . . . 
Sometimes, certain limitations of man are 
reached and exceeded, indeed. For example, when 
a pilot tries to suppress high frequency oscilla- 
tions. However, such critical flight characteris- 
tics do not prevail in the landing phase. 
Of course, man cannot penetrate fog with his 
eyes; However, in order to remain consequent, it 
would be unreasonable to blame him for this fact. 
Otherwise, he should be considered to be blame- 
worthy, too, because he needs to015, machines 
to carry heavy loads, artificial wings to fly, etc. 
The characteristics of the aircraft, of the con- 
trols, and of the gust disturbances in principle 
do not change and the same human sensors 
remain active as soon as flight conditions change 
to  IMC. A rigorous change happens in the type 
of information only. Therefore this and it’s inter- 
ference with basic human characteristics must be 
the main source of the problem. Furthermore, 
this suggests, that the substitutes for visual 
contact presently in operation are not yet equiv- 
alent, although visual contact itself has been 
shown to provide poor information in some 
respect, too (see paper 21 and (ref. 7)). 
Finally, the inevitable predominance of the 
automatic in landing control is justified only if 
the present information display concepts are 
approximately the best that can be achieved at 
all. 
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EVOLUTION OF THE DISPLAY 
PROBLEM 
A quick look at the evolution of the display 
problem may help to emphasize the main “knots 
in the network” (fig. 1). 
Some aspects of the field of aeronautics are 
composed here according to diff efent applicable 
activities of man. However, let us concentrate on 
man in his role as a systems component, especi- 
ally as a pilot. In  his other activities within the 
whole, he has more or less direct, or secondary, 
influence with the central display problem. The 
other part of the “link systems” the controls are 
eliminated here, although their man-compatible 
outlay plays a remarkable role in the limitations 
of the total systems performance. 
Aircraft performance increased rapidly under 
the powerful drive of basic human desires. On 
the other hand, the human “ability for unaided 
information pick-up” and “some desire” or, a t  
least: “acceptance to perform difficult tasks” 
delayed the development of the artificial infor- 
mation sources. Economy and the desire for 
independence from day time and meteorological 
conditions partly provided for some accelerating 
as well as unfavorable inputs to the display 
development. The other part of this influence 
made use of the human “readiness to adapt to 
almost every demand.” This combination of 
inputs necessarily led, via a “completion” of the 
information step by step, to the “logic” result, 
the additive display as we know it from present 
cockpits. The built-in ‘L1ag-mechanism,’l how- 
ever, is responsible that even this simplest re- 
quirement for complete information relative to 
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FIGTJRH 1.-Evolution of the display problem. 
the demands of operation was fulfilled in rare 
cases only. It should not be surprising that there 
are still gaps to be filled. The following is quoted 
from reference 8. 
. . . None of the parameters . . . flare initiation, 
decrab, touch down point . . . are available on the 
instrument panel . . . (inusable form) . . . 
The visual switching of man operates at a high 
performance level, when compared with other 
motion functions of the human body. The fact 
that basically the additive display-in whatever 
stage of maturity-does not allow the systems 
optimum to be reached has been obscured for 
some time: 
Sinaiko (ref. 9) stated 
. . . man can perform several kinds of tasks simultane- 
ously or in rapid succession and keep them all integrated. 
This is true in normal every-day conditions. 
However, as soon as a complex riskful task has 
to be performed under severe time constraint, 
the opposite unfavorable side of the (minutely 
examined) organization principle of the human 
,I 2b mtal blockage 
L 
D I F F I C U L T Y  L E V E L  
FIGURE 2.-Human performance behavior. 
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visual becomes apparent. Kelly in reference 10 
mentions 
The human operator can attend to only one thing at a 
time; he is a single channel device in this sense . . . 
The increasing performance of the aircraft, on 
the one hand, impaired the flight characteristics; 
but on the other hand, the step from circular 
grass airfields to narrow concrete runways was 
necessary and required a much more precise 
guidance. 
The following is a translated remark in a 1935 
paper by Schulz (ref. 11): 
Landing in poor weather (dense fog included) is a prob- 
lem, the main part of which is considered to be solved; 
within a few years the last difficulties will have been 
overcome. 
We know, the progress “by-passed the last diffi- 
culties,” which grew in the meanwhile and was 
“baked” to be a very resistant problem now. 
After all, the “single channelness of attention” 
of man in a task of increasing difficulty made the 
manual control with information from an addi- 
tive display critical. Operation under marginal 
conditions primarily became a stability problem. 
Human Performance Behavior 
We saw that the willingness of man to adapt 
had an unfavorable influence in the evolution 
process. This would have been avoided, if the 
“man in the loop” would allow the performance 
of the system to drop, e.g., linearly, with increas- 
ing difficulty (fig. 2(a)). He does not. Instead of 
this, he amplifies his effort and maintains the 
overall performance approximately constant (fig. 
2(b)), as demonstrated by Henry Jex during this 
conference. Due to the raised effort man per- 
ceives stress as soon as a certain difficulty level is 
exceeded (fig. 2(c)). 
Compensating the difficulty with effort neces- 
sarily reduces the reserves of man and thus of the 
system’s stability. As soon as the human capac- 
ity is saturated, a steep break down occurs and 
either a simpler task is adopted or, if this is 
impossible, a catastrophy may result. 
TRIED SOLUTIONS 
Figure 3 shows a rudimentary diagram of 
FIGURE 3.-Types of known solutions. 
known efforts to overcome a problem. Some 
impressions and knowledge of limitations as well 
as abilities of man and automatics, respectively, 
split the activity-some of which diverged into 
opposite directions. Not all of these are indicated 
here and two, the improved education and sim- 
plification of machine are mentioned only. Figure 
3 concentrates on the trends towards display im- 
provement for manual control and towards sub- 
stitution of man by fully competent automatics. 
Improvement of Controllability 
by Displays 
Display improvements have been achieved, for 
example, by compressing the distributed indi- 
cators into-I prefer to call it--“accumulative 
displays.” 
Steering commands, which combine the differ- 
ent separate variables are obligatory for auto- 
matic control. They were made available for the 
pilot, too, in the f x m  of command displays, e.g., 
director needles. 
While the first step, the accumulation, reduced 
information scanning, command should have 
completely eliminated this main destabilizer on 
the first superficial view. 
What can be effected in terms of stabilization 
with a “fully integrated” display is symbolized in 
figure 4 by a simple mechanical model. In  control 
tasks with “distributed information” the pilot 
has to stabilize (dependent upon the difficulty 
level) a more or less unstable system. Unstable, 
because too much relaxation in information 
scanning activity increases deviations from the 
desired conditions and thus the control diffi- 
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FIGURE 4.-Effect of tunnel-vision =function of display. 
culties. This in turn, tends to further reduce the 
scanning frequency. 
As soon as the stabilizing capability of man is 
exhausted, the information transfer runs “down- 
hill” below the satisfactory threshold. If, on the 
other hand, the pilot is provided with fully 
integrated information, which has it’s threshold 
of satisfactory information transfer at “the bot- 
tom of a valley” (fig. 4), the destabilizing scanning 
process is no longer required. It may be used to 
gather additional secondary or detail data; how- 
ever, in cases where attention must be concen- 
trated, man automatically returns to the main 
source of a continuous fully integrated flow of 
information. In this case, the information transfer 
would be inherently stable. In  other words, since 
the pilot has a strong tendency to “tunnel-vision,” 
it is reasonable not to fight against this but to 
give him the “tunnel.” 
Returning to figure 3 we can say that the pure 
command display already is some type of fully 
integrated information. However, pure impera- 
tive indications are not satisfactory. Although 
there are some pilots (and people) who accept or 
even like command, most of them feel a natural 
need at least to check its validity. So the accumu- 
lated situation indicators were combined with 
command in the so-called integrated instrument 
systems (IIS), which are the well known ADI/ 
HSI-instruments, presently in wide use. 
Progress in electronics has led to conversion of 
the ADI-display into the CRT-equivalent : the 
electronic attitude director indicator (EADI). 
Although to a lesser extent than before, the prob- 
lems of single channelness of attention and infor- 
mation scanning and systems stability were 
adopted again with the 11s and EADI. Further- 
more, in operations under marginal visibility it 
became obvious that the present state of the art 
does not cover, to a satisfactory extent, the human 
psychological need for confidence. The following 
observations of Stout and Naish (ref. 12) empha- 
size this: 
. . . pilots anxiety level increased at an alarmingly fast 
rate below 100 f t  (altitude in true blind landings, 
manually controlled with a certain modern Flight 
Director). 
Obviously, the conventional type of situation 
display, although sometimes provided with the 
term “pictorial,” is not yet realistic enough. The 
following remark of Armitage (ref. 13) indicates 
a possible solution: 
There appears to be a great need for a real world-type 
display derived from . . . data of a source other than 
ILS. 
TV- and infrared techniques and the recent 
progress in radar have made possible a picture of 
the runway during the final phase of a landing 
even through dense fog. In  some displays this 
picture is combined with the EADI-Information. 
The independent landing monitor (ILM), a radar- 
image according to the statement of Armitage 
(ref. 13), is intended to be used not as an aid for 
manual control but as a separate ‘confidence 
producer’ for the pilot who supervises the auto- 
matic landing. 
Another important type of outer loop-informa- 
tion, the preview-display, should, at least, be 
mentioned here. There is no instrumentation of 
this type in general use today. 
Both, pure command or IIS, as well as pure 
contact analog, had been shown to be unsatis- 
factory, as has been presented in separate dis- 
plays. In a paper presented at the AGARD 
Symposium in 1968 (ref. 14) we can find the 
following surprising remark of Douwes Dekker 
which shows that superimposition of different 
elements is undesirable : 
. . . Complete obedience to the HUD-director signals 
was required. This was best achieved with windshield 
blanked out, to prevent the pilot from being disturbed 
by the outside world. This most curious contradiction 
. . . indicates that FD-signals, having no direct rela- 
tionship with the visual cues, should not be superimposed 
on the outside world. 
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AIMS FOR DISPLAY DESIGN 
Obviously, the question is now, how we can 
achieve the desirable complete integration of 
quantitative indications, outer loop information 
and real-world display, in order to fulfil the 
requirements of controllability and confidence, 
respectively. 
Gibson (ref. 15) and Metager (ref. 16) and 
probably other psychologists have shown the 
high extent which man is emotionally stabilized 
in his habitual fixed environment. This is pri- 
marily achieved by the realistic, and in motions 
quickly changing, the appearance of near-by 
objects which are reasonably distributed in the 
visual world, and, furthermore, by a very intense 
correlation of the inputs from all the affected 
human senses. 
Since the natural environment of an aircraft is 
not filled with space-fixed objects, a simple copy 
of the real world has proven unsatisfactory. 
More or less abstract superimposed additives are 
undesirable. However, the useful part of the real 
world can be extended by suitable imaginary 
objects apparently fixed in space. Such a com- 
plex pictorial presentation can provide for each 
desired sensitivity. 
The symbology of pictorial displays can be 
designed to provide for all necessary quantitative 
information content by pure pictorial means. It 
is a wrong assumption that pictorial displays in 
principle are less accurate and qualitatively only. 
Furthermore, such pictorial displays which 
meet the aims mentioned before inherently con- 
tain some outer loop-information to a much 
higher degree than generally recognized. Sep- 
arate indicators for command, preview, and flight 
path vector will thus be superfluous. 
These display qualities are evaluated in detail 
in reference 17. 
The presentation until now has only touched 
the controllability and the confidence compo- 
nents of the problem area. However, the require- 
ments for really advanced displays extend 
beyond these aims. Modern aircraft operation 
demands for a maximum of flexibility, e.g., for 
noise abatement-STOL-operation on small air- 
fields which may be surrounded by high obsta- 
cles. We know that modern instruments do not 
allow an approach such as is possible in visual 
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FIGURE 5.-Desirable flexibility in landing approach. 
contact turning approaches (fig. 5 ) .  Present in- 
struments require all dynamics of motion, except 
speed, to be suppressed in a 5 to 8 mile long 
straight-in approach in order to effect a safe 
landing. Straight approach suits the desire for 
comfort, yes. However, up to now not much more 
in terms of flexibility is possible. 
Turning approaches, contradictory as it may 
seem, are safer and easier to perform (ref. 18) 
and, therefore, are used by fighter pilots and 
recommended for space shuttle landing (ref. 19). 
A true precision task in terms of a tight control 
of all degrees of freedom prevails in relatively 
short phases of flight only-if a t  all. I n  general, 
the last 10 sec of a landing might be considered 
as such. But, more accuracy is required in close 
formation flight and flight refuelling. In  spite of 
that, these tasks are performed with admirable 
perfection which indicates that landing cannot 
be too difficult a task for manual control if a 
suitable display is provided. 
The proficiency of a pilot depends upon his 
training in precision control. Thus, presenting a 
display which continuously demands a reason- 
ably high precision of guidance would raise the 
average manual skills to a remarkably higher 
level. 
The ability of man to “differentiate” and 
“integrate” is much better than sometimes as- 
sumed; it can be raised to an artistical level as 
an overwhelming number of examples, even in 
every-day life, demonstrate. This should conse- 
quently be used for improvement of manual con- 
trol of an aircraft by better display techniques. 
The following summarizes the main aims of 
display quality requirements: 
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Controllability of the system: 
task simplification only. 
tivities of man 
bilities. 
Flexibility of the system: 
(1) Not as easy as possible, when achieved by artificial 
(2) According to demands of high performance ac- 
(3) Economic use of superb human dynamic capa- 
(1) Free selection of safe flight trajectories 
(2) Response to operational requirements. 
(1) Raised beyond the present state 
(2) Maximum use of human reflexes +intelligence 
(3) Selection of the most suitable individuals. 
(1) In space orientation 
(2) In  his own ability as pilot in the loop 
(3) In the overall situation 
(4) In the functional reliabilities may be less important. 
Proficiency of the pilot: 
Confidence of the pilot: 
FINAL REMARKS 
Let me add a further statement to confidence. 
My impression is that we cannot hope for any 
spontaneous confidence when we base it only on 
partly experienced, finally extrapolated, and 
believed or not believed high reliability of the 
equipment. The pilot needs a back-up by a 
confidence-immanent information display! 
With respect to the acceptance of advanced 
automatics, we cannot derive that the automatic 
solution is near-optimum if pilots accept the role 
of a manager without being able to demonstrate 
true competence in manual control during each 
phase of flight. They must and probably will 
accept a dominating autopilot and reduced in- 
stead of improved displays, if no convincing 
alternative is in sight; otherwise, they will prob- 
ably lose their job. The extreme tendency of man 
to adapt allows him to develop a fatalistic type 
of confidence. On the other hand, a pilot will 
like to delegate the complete landing even to a 
less reliable automatic if the display enables him 
to chose and perform alternative decisions in 
case of not only an overshoot but a take over. 
Two examples of our approach to solve the 
problem are shown in figure 6, 7, and 8. 
The main display element is a channel or a 
tunnel, which has been developed by conse- 
quently applying the street-shaped symbol for 
lateral and vertical guidance in all flight phases. 
This concept is described in more detail in 
references 5 and 17. 
FIGURE 6.-Entering MUN holding pattern. 
‘I 
FIGURE 7.-A channel for unpowered landings; glide 
angle variability, wind, and flare capability have been 
accounted for. 
We feel sure that we can meet the require- 
ments of controllability, flexibility, and profi- 
ciency. We believe that we have a good chance 
to fulfil the confidence-requirement, too. How- 
ever, we are aware that this is very difficult to 
demonstrate. 
DEPENDENCE OF INFORMATION 
FIGURE 8.-Channel information for collision avoidance. 
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